“War” – being thoroughly kinetic and rife with explosions, blood and high-powered guns – is maybe not the best term to describe this phenomenon, which is not kinetic at all..
What if you were to read that in the Russian military doctrine there is no such thing as information war? Would that make you more at ease? After all, if it is not defined in an Allied Joint Publication or a Field Manual, it does not exist. And if it does not exist, the problem is solved, right? Hold your horses. What if you were to read that instead of information war, the Kremlin prefers the term informatsionnoye protivoborstvo (IPb), which translates into information confrontation. So, is confrontation still more peaceful than war if you know that it comes from Olgino near Saint Petersburg and that we are part of it whether we like it or not?
For Russia, information confrontation is a “calculated use, and misuse, of information [which] has then the potential to affect financial markets, business practices, societal perceptions, attitudes and behaviours. It is an ongoing activity aimed at influencing and conditioning perceptions that demoralise both military personnel and civilian populations.” So, Russia’s information confrontation is in fact a buffed-up version of western information war(fare) with little to no limitations in place.
It is a clear fact that the Russian state is acting in a hostile manner not only towards its neighbours but also towards the general concept of safety, security, peace and freedom. When doing so, Russia uses all possible ways to bend the will of people and impose a world order which is in line with the so-called russkij mir. And information used as a subject and a tool is at the very centre of these efforts.
Having said all that, we can all agree that Russia developed a theory for communication – a tool that is key for military operations –that it puts into practice even before hostilities break out. And while information knows and respects no physical boundaries, I will limit the scope of this article to the Baltic Sea Region — the region which in modern times has become the first to defend itself against the Russian bear’s propaganda, and at the same time the region which is NATO’s easternmost border. Consequently, it is a very arduous and complex information battlefield, even for such an experienced and perplexing player as Russia.
We must debunk one large (sic!) myth – the idea that the Baltic Sea Region can be treated as a homogeneous area when it comes to information-related matters. There is no such thing in the information domain. Not even the Baltic States (understood as the three countries north of Poland, south of Finland, west of Russia, on the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea) should be understood as one and the same. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (additionally Poland) are three different battlefields which, although linked, are very much separate and each require an individual approach, both in the field of defence and offence. What works in Latvia might not necessarily work in Lithuania and most likely will not work in Poland. Simultaneously, after small changes, it perhaps works in Estonia. Why is it so? The answer is arguably simple and boils down to three main factors: ethnicity (percentage of Russian-speakers), national unity (also understood as resilience, the feeling of belonging to the country of residence) and language (knowledge of the Russian language).
When browsing Russian influence outlets (it would be unethical to call them media), it can be observed how the battlefield is seen from Moscow. It seems that for them the whole region is divided into two fronts. First, owing to the presence of a substantial number of Russian speakers, Estonia and Latvia are in Zone 1 (high presence) while Lithuania and Poland are in Zone 2 (low presence). This means that it is in theory much easier for Russia to influence Estonians and Latvians than Lithuanians or Poles. It is partially true, but in Moscow’s simplified approach, which focuses mostly on numbers, the way Russian-speakers see their linkage to their country of residence tends to be disregarded. And most of younger generations feel closer connected to the West than the East. This makes them more resilient and less susceptible to the charms of the Russian bear.
Does this mean that Lithuania is not targeted by Moscow? Unfortunately, not. More than 50 years of occupation mean that the Russian language is present in Lithuania. And while the number of Russian speakers remains low compared to its northern neighbours, it still is significant enough to pose a challenge. This leads us to the second venue of approach – a linguistic one, based on the popularity and knowledge of the Russian language. In this approach, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are in Zone A (high to medium level of Russian literacy) while Poland creates a separate Zone B (low level of Russian literacy). This division means that thanks to the common denominator, which is language, in theory, the content created for Estonia could be used in Lithuania. And, occasionally, we can indeed observe such phenomena taking place.
Yet, this approach is rather limited in gains because it deprives information of its relatability. A key factor in successful influencing is making the context close to the heart of the receiver. And this means that what is going to work in Tallinn will most likely not work in Vilnius. The predominant use of such an approach geared towards re-using a more general topic, therefore, is used to give this false information traction.” Or to use a quote often falsely attributed to Stalin: “Quantity has a quality all its own.” Finally, Russia can at least partially count on Russian speakers from the three Baltic countries being able to access, read and become influenced by outlets tailored to an inter-Russian audience. Such a probability is slim, but nevertheless exists.
A hopefully still not bored reader might say: “Hey, partner, you forgot Poland!” Well, yes and no or jein, as our German colleagues say. Poland is a tougher bone for the Russian IPb not because it is a large homogeneous country or because it is somewhat resilient. Poland is a tougher bone because it requires a separate approach. Whatever might work in Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania due to the presence of Russian speakers or Russian literacy will not work in Poland precisely due to the absence thereof. It does not mean that Poles are not targeted but, probably for the aforementioned reasons, the means are less sophisticated and in most cases opportunity-based.
Furthermore, while in Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania, the Russian IPb is focused mostly on the post-1991 highlights, in Poland the breeding ground is the pre-1945 period with particular focus on Germany and Ukraine. Being the most efficient in triggering Poles, those issues are constantly used as a basis for propaganda tailored to the very profile of Polish mentality and sensibility, with sometimes surprising efficiency. That is why, tempting as it may be, one must not give in to the false sense of security that may arise from this apparent, yet very deceptive resilience.
Without a doubt, the Baltic Sea Region is a complicated, contested battlefield for the hearts and minds of people. The Preamble to the Constitution of UNESCO declares that “since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed.” Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles and other members of NATO are on the frontline of the fight for the values and interests of the free world. However, the shadows of Mordor are rising, as the night is dark and full of terrors.